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THE NINTH CIRCUIT RENEGADE-
UNITED STATES v. $405,089.23 U.S. CURRENCY:
FINDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN A SINGLE
COORDINATED PROSECUTION
INTRODUCTION
It has increasingly become the practice of federal and state prosecutors to
seek both criminal and civil sanctions against accused persons for the alleged
commission of a single crime.' Prosecutors are required to file concurrent,
parallel suits alleging civil and criminal causes of action because of the
different evidentiary burdens on the prosecution in civil and criminal actions.'
Beginning with United States v. Halper,3 the Supreme Court's double
jeopardy jurisprudence has increasingly protected defendants from civil
sanctions following criminal convictions.4 As a result, defendants facing
parallel criminal and civil actions have asserted the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy,5 hoping that courts will extend the protection against
subsequent civil suits to concurrent civil suits.' One federal court of appeals
has led the way.' On September 6, 1994, in United States v. $405,089.23
' See, e.g., Elkan Abramowitz, Double Jeopardy and Civil Sanctions, N.Y.L. J., July 5,
1994, at 3 [hereinafter Abramowitz].
2 See, e.g., United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17,20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
922 (1994).
1 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
4 See id. at 451 ("[T]he [g]ovemment may not criminally prosecute a defendant, impose a
criminal penalty up on him, and then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and
receive ajudgment that is not rationally related to the goal of making the [g]ovemment whole.")
(footnote omitted); Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945
(1994) ("A defendant convicted and punished for an offense may not have a nonremedial civil
penalty [including a tax] imposed against him for the same offense.").5 See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 60 F.3d 886 (1st Cir. 1995), petitionfor cert.filed, (U.S.
Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-6474); United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995),petition
for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-345); United States v.
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) affd as modifieden banc, 56 F.3d
41 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-
346); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669
(1994); United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). See also infra
note 21.
1 Although some state courts have found that the protection against double jeopardy insulates
criminally prosecuted defendants from civil prosecutions in separate proceedings, see Matt
Schwartz, Court Ruling Likely to Alter War on Drugs; Says Forfeiture ofAssets can be Double
Jeopardy, THE HOUSTON POST, July 23, 1994, at Al (some Texas courts so hold); Russell
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U.S. Currency,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
became the first federal court of appeals to hold that the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars parallel civil and criminal suits arising from the same offense.'
This Note reviews the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence in
Part I, explains the facts, reasoning, and analysis of $405,089.23 in Part 11,
and critiques the Ninth Circuit's logic and purported adherence to precedent
in Part III. Part 11(A) argues that the Constitution requires, and the Court's
"continuing jeopardy" analysis permits, the government to coordinate criminal
and civil actions against a defendant in a fictional, single prosecution. Part
III(B) elucidates the failure of $405,089.23 to apply the appropriate test to
distinguish punishment from remedial sanctions in double jeopardy claims.
This Note's analyses seek to clarify and preserve three Supreme Court
precedents---Jeffers v. United States,"0 United States v. Halper," and Austin
v. United States 2 -upon which the Ninth Circuit based much of its reason-
ing, and to demonstrate the Supreme Court's growing awareness of the
problem that lower courts must resolve in applying the Double Jeopardy
Clause to civil sanctions. "3
I. BACKGROUND: DOUBLE JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE
GENERALLY
The Double Jeopardy Clause states, "No person shall ... be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."" When the
Founders included this provision in the Constitution, the prohibition against
trying a person for an offense for which he had already received judgment was
"deeply rooted in the law of England, as an indispensable requirement of a
civilized criminal procedure, [and thus] was inevitably part of the [American]
Carollo, Above the Law; New Rulings Complicate Drug Crime Forfeitures, NEWS TRIBUNE,
June 19, 1994, atA7 (Washington Supreme Court so holds), the author limits the scope of this
Note to the federal courts of appeals.
' United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), affd as
modified en banc, 56 F.3d41 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S.
Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346).
9 But see Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 (suggesting the same result in dicta).
'0 Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
" United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
12 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
13 See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (1994).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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legal tradition."15 Although the First Congress debated the scope of the
protection against multiple trials and punishments, "[tlhe need for the princi-
ple's general protection was undisputed."16 Over the years, a general under-
standing of the protection developed. 7
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against two basic abuses: succes-
sive prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.'" The
policies prohibiting successive prosecutions include the defendant's "valid
interest in (1) not being subjected to the embarrassment, stigma, expense, and
emotional ordeal of a second criminal prosecution; and (2) not having to live
in a continuing state of anxiety, insecurity, and uncertainty at the prospect of
being indicted and tried again."' 9 The policies prohibiting multiple punish-
ments include fairness and predictability-"ensuring that the total punishment
does not exceed that authorized by the legislature. 20
There are, of course, exceptions to the application of these general
constitutional policies.2 For example, notwithstanding the Double Jeopardy
United States v. Green, 355 U.S. 184,200 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1d. at 201.
"See, e.g., id. at 187 ("IT]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense .... ).
"
8 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,440 (1989) (subdividing the protection against
successive prosecutions into those including second prosecutions following both acquittals and
convictions) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
9 Elizabeth S. Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double
Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 112, 136 (1991) [hereinafter
Jahncke]; see also Rebecca F. Dallet, Comment, Taking the Ammunition Away From the War
on Drugs". A DoubleJeopardyBarto 21 U.S.C. §881 After Austin v. United States, 44 CAsE
W. RES. L. REV. 235,242 (1993) [hereinafter Dallet] ('The bar against successive prosecution
also denies the prosecution an opportunity to perfect their case against the defendant until they
successfully convict him or her.").20 Jahncke, supra note 19, at 134-35; Dallet, supra note 19, at 242.
21 Foremost among the exceptions is that a court may impose multiple punishments in a single
proceeding. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
366 (1983); Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1981); Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980). This suggests that the two protections, although distinct, work in
tandem. See, e.g., Hunter at 368-69 ("Where ... a legislature specifically authorizes
cumulative punishment under two statutes ... the prosecutor may seek and the trial court may
impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.").
Despite the codependency of the two protections, circuit court guidance for an eventual
Supreme Court resolution has generally dealt with either separate proceedings or multiple
punishments, but not both. See generally, e.g., S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (resolving only the multiple punishment issue); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463
(7th Cir. 1994) (expressing an opinion about separate proceedings, but resolving the case on
other grounds), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th
Cir. 1994) (resolving only the multiple punishment issue), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994);
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Clause bar to successive prosecutions, the Court has long allowed retrials
following successful appeals from convictions infected by trial error.22 The
law allows the second trial, conceiving it as a continuation of jeopardy that
"rest[s] on an amalgam of interests-e.g., fairness to society, lack of finality,
and limited waiver, among others. 23 As the Court explained the continuing
jeopardy rationale in United States v. Burks,24 retrial is permitted following
reversals for trial error because "the accused has a strong interest in obtaining
a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a
valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished., 25  Moreover, the
Court noted in Richardson v. United States,26 "[T]he protection of the Double
Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such
as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. ' 27 This language
"suggests that an event which terminates [original] jeopardy is a condition
precedent to a defendant's assertion of a double jeopardy claim."2 Thus, the
nonoccurrence of an event terminating original jeopardy leaves a defendant
United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493 (1 Ith Cir. 1994) (resolving only
the separate proceedings issue for double jeopardy analysis); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17
(2d Cir. 1993) (resolving only the separate proceedings issue), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922
(1994).
United Slates v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) aff'd as modified
en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28,
1995) (No. 95-346) resolves both issues.
22See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957);
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
2Green, 355 U.S. at 329 n.4.
24 United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
2Id. at 15; see also United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,466 (1963) ("Corresponding to the
right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is
clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were
every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute
reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction."). But see Burks, 437 U.S. at 18
("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found
the evidence legally insufficient, [because] the only 'just' remedy available for that court is the
direction of a judgment of acquittal.").
26 Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984).
2 Id. at 325.
28 United States v. Ganos, 961 F.2d 1284, 1286 (7th Cir. 1992) (Ripple, J., concurring) (citing
United States v. Wood, 958 F.2d 963, 969 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that Richardson "offers
little guidance on what events, other than an acquittal, terminate jeopardy")). But cf Sarah 0.
Wang, Note, Insufficient Attention to Insufficient Evidence: Some Double Jeopardy
Implications, 79 VA. L. REV. 1381 (1993) [hereinafter Wang] (arguing that the uncertainty
regarding what events sufficiently ripen the right to protect one from a second jeopardy
diminishes continuingjeopardy's authority, but noting that the Supreme Court currently accepts
it).
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vulnerable to a second trial,29 but preserves the policy goals of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.30
Another kind of second trial allowed despite the protection against double
jeopardy is a second governmental prosecution seeking remedial civil sanc-
tions.3' Historically, the Supreme Court has held that all fines assessed in
civil proceedings which follow criminal trials comport with the Double
Jeopardy Clause because such sanctions are invariably remedial, and are not
punitive.32
In United States v. Ward,33 the Court resolved a challenge to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 34 which compelled persons "in charge of a
vessel or of an onshore facility or an offshore facility" to notify the United
States government upon any oil or hazardous substance discharge.3" Because
Congress imposed a "penalty"36 on those in charge of such vessels or facili-
ties, L.O. Ward, who oversaw a drilling facility near Enid, Oklahoma, sought
to persuade the Court that "the Act violated his privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination 37 grounded in the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause.3" Noting that the statute denominated the penalty as a "civil
penalty,"39 and that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies only to "any
criminal case,"'4 the Court rejected Ward's constitutional challenge.4 In so
holding, the Court adopted a presumption of congressional accuracy in
29See Wang, supra note 28, at 1390.
3oSee, eg., Richardson, supra note 26, at 325 ("[J]eopardy does not terminate when the jury
is discharged [merely] because it is unable to agree."); Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon,
466 U.S. 294 (1984) (holding that a defendant who elects to partake in two-tier trial does not
terminate original jeopardy after conviction in the first trial).
31 See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994); United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). See also the discussion infra at Part 11(B).
31 See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). But see, e.g., Hess,
317 U.S. at 554 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting that a civil penalty becomes
punishment when it exceeds reasonable compensation for the government's loss).
33 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
14See33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
3sId. at § 1321(b)(5).36 Id. at § 1321(b)(6)(A).
37 Ward, 448 U.S. at 247.
38 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself .... ).
3933 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(a) (1988).40 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
4' Ward, 448 U.S. at 250-5 1.
1995]
72 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
labeling a statute's enforcement purpose as either civil or criminal, for both
double jeopardy and self-incrimination analysis.42
United States v. One Assortment of89 Firearms43 permitted the Supreme
Court to hold the Ward presumption applicable to the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The Court did so by unanimously holding that a claimant's prior
criminal trial did not bar the government's subsequent, related civil forfeiture
action because Congress intended it to be "a remedial civil sanction."" The
Court, merely holding what it had already suggested in Ward,4 5 delivered a
unanimous opinion."
Five years later, the Supreme Court changed the applicable test in another
unanimous decision.47 In United States v. Halper, the Court held that labels
attached by Congress to particular statutory sanctions were no longer pre-
sumptive determinants of whether those sanctions constitute punishment,
thereby triggering the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.4"
Unfortunately, the test that Halper promulgated includes confusing and
contradictory language49 which has indirectly led to the erroneous law of the
Ninth Circuit.50
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT:
UNITED STATES v. $405,089.23 U.S. CURRENCY l
A. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
On June 12, 1991, a grand jury indicted James Wren, Charles Arlt, and
Payback Mines on various counts of conspiracy and money laundering arising
42 See id. at 248-251 (cautioning the judiciary to carefully review a statute's construction
when determining its sanction's nature or purpose--civil thus remedial, or criminal thus
punitive--because of the general procedural implications in affixing the appropriate evidentiary
burdens under the Sixth Amendment).
"' United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
44Id. at 363.
41 See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.46 See One Assortment of89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 355.
41 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 436 (1989).
41Id. at 447.
49 See infra Part III(B).
See infra Part II.
5' United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd as
modifieden banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995),petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S.
Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346).
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from illegal drug transactions5 2 Five days later, the United States government
filed a civil proceeding seeking to forfeit property worth several hundred
thousand dollars 3 The property included the balances in four bank accounts,
over $100,000 in cash, 138 silver bars, bonds, a helicopter, an airplane, two
boats, and eleven automobiles. 4 The government claimed two grounds
warranted the forfeiture: the goods' status as illegal proceeds of the drug
trade under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6),55 and the goods' status as property used in
illegal money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) 6 The parties
agreed to suspend the civil forfeiture action until after the criminal case was
resolved."
Over eight months after the defendants' criminal convictions on March
27, 1992,18 the government filed a motion for summary judgment in the
parallel civil action. 9 The United States District Court for the Central
District of California granted this motion and the defendants appealed.6" In
their appeal, the defendants asserted, among other things, that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment precluded civil forfeiture of property
secured through activities having already resulted in criminal convictions and
12 See id. at 1214.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988) states:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall
exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable
to such an exchange, and all money's negotiable instruments, and
securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph,
to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
56 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) (1988) states:
[T]he following property is subject to forfeiture to the United States:
(A) Any property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted
transaction in violation of section 5313(a) or 5324(a) of title 31, or of
section 1956 or 1957 of this title, or any property traceable to such
property.
5s $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1214.
58 But see United States v. Arlt, 42 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing Charles Arlt's
conviction for trial error).
1s $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1214.
6 1Id. at 1214-15.
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punishment.6 The Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the case on appeal, and on
September 6, 1994, rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners in United
States v.$405,089.23 U.S. Currency.
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE
Writing for a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel, Judge Reinhardt began
$405,089.23 by pointing out that "at its most fundamental level [the Double
Jeopardy Clause] protects an accused against being forced to defend himself
against repeated attempts to exact one or more punishments for the same
offense."' Noting that both the forfeiture at issue and the concluded criminal
trial "addressed the identical violations of the identical laws,"6 Judge
Reinhardt determined that the government could and should have sought both
forfeiture and conviction without subjecting the defendants to "multiple and
successive proceedings."64 Judge Reinhardt asserted that because "the only
difference between the two proceedings was the remedy sought by the
government... [i]t could have included a criminal forfeiture count in the
indictment which led to the claimants' convictions."6 By not including the
criminal forfeiture count, the government raised double jeopardy concerns.66
Judge Reinhardt then considered the two critical issues of Supreme Court
Double Jeopardyjurisprudence: 67 "whether the civil forfeiture action and the
claimants' criminal prosecution constituted separate 'proceedings,' and
whether civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) constitutes 'punishment."' 6
1. The Scope of the Proceeding
The panel first addressed the question regarding the double jeopardy
scope of the criminal proceeding. After acknowledging that the Second and
Eleventh Circuits had recently held that separate criminal trials and civil
61 See id. at 1215.
62 id.
61Id. at 1216.
64 Id.
65id
66 Id.
61 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
61 $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1216.
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forfeitures arising from the same offense constitute a single, coordinated
prosecution for double jeopardy analysis,6 9 Judge Reinhardt stated that such
a position "contradicts controlling Supreme Court precedent as well as
common sense."7  Appealing first to common sense, Judge Reinhardt
indicated that the government obtains an unfair and possibly unlawful
advantage if it can persuade the district court to follow the customary practice
of holding the civil forfeiture action "in abeyance pending the outcome of the
criminal prosecution."'7 If the government succeeds in obtaining a conviction,
it can use that result to prevail in the civil trial with a summary judgment.7" If
the government obtains an acquittal, it can still seek the forfeiture by urging
that the civil action's more lenient rules and evidentiary burdens should
apply.73
Next, Judge Reinhardt revived a seventeen year old Supreme Court case,
Jeffers v. United States,74 to assert that the protection against double jeopardy
prohibits separate, albeit concurrent, proceedings that potentially result in
separate punishments of imprisonment and financial sanctions.75 In Jeffers,
the government sought to prosecute the defendant for two related criminal
offenses: conspiring to distribute controlled substances and participating in
a continuing criminal enterprise to violate drug laws.76 Jeffers opposed
joining the offenses for trial and thus forced the government to prosecute the
actions consecutively.' He then moved to dismiss the second count on double
jeopardy grounds after the district court convicted him on the first.7' The
Supreme Court, in a divided judgment, narrowly affirmed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's rejection of Jeffers' double jeopardy argument.79  A four Justice
plurality held that "although a defendant is normally entitled to have [multi-
9 Id. (citing United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994)).
70 $405,089.23,33 F.3d at 1216 & n.4 (clarifying that the panel expressed no opinion on the
double jeopardy implications of a defendant's consent to separate trials, or when the same
fact-finder and judicial officer preside over bifurcated proceedings).
71 d. at 1217.
nId. (citing 1 DAvID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES, 10.01,
at 10-4 to 10-5 (1993)).
71 $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1217.74 Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
11 $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1217.76 Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 140-41.
77 Id. at 142-43.
78 Id. at 144.
79Id. at 158.
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ple] charges ... resolved in one proceeding, there is no violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause when he elects to have the two offenses tried
separately."8 In dissent, four Justices noted, "The Court's disposition is
especially troubling because eight Justices agree that petitioner's constitu-
tional right was violated and only four are persuaded that he waived his
doublejeopardy objection." 81 Following the four dissenters' line of reasoning,
the panel in $405,089.23 concluded that "the decisions of eight of the nine
[J]ustices in Jeffers rested on the common sense proposition that two parallel
criminal cases, which unquestionably were brought as a part of a 'single,
coordinated prosecution,' constituted 'separate proceedings' for double
jeopardy purposes."82
2. The Test for Punishment
Having resolved the first critical issue, the panel proceeded to determine
whether the forfeiture that the government sought to impose constituted
punishment.83 First, Judge Reinhardt explicated a recent history of the
Supreme Court's characterization of particular sanctions as punishment.8 4 As
recently as 1984, observed Judge Reinhardt, the Supreme Court applied a
double jeopardy test that focused on the congressional label attached to
particular sanctions-civil or criminal--to conclude that "Congress intended
for forfeiture to be 'a remedial civil sanction."' ' 5 However, the Supreme
Court retreated from that position in United States v. Halper,86 holding that
congressional intent was no longer controlling.87 Noting that the Court had
recently changed the law in Halper, Judge Reinhardt explained that civil
80 Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 160 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part).
8 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'das
modified en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995),petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S.
Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346).83 Id.
84 Id.
' Id. (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984));
see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (promulgating the Ward test, which
deferred the status of a sanction as either punitive or remedial to the congressional
label-criminal or civil-attached to the sanction).
" United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,447 (1989) (holding that the congressional labels
attached to a sanction do not determine whether it constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes).87 id.
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sanctions which exceed purely remedial purposes"8 now constitute punishment
for double jeopardy analysis.8 9
Bolstering support for the finding that civil forfeitures constitute punish-
ment for double jeopardy analysis, Judge Reinhardt restated the Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment analysis in Austin v. United States.90 There,
according to Judge Reinhardt, the Court employed the Halper test to apply the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause91 to civil forfeitures arising
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).92 Reasoning by analogy that the
Halper test consistently evaluates a sanction's status regardless of the
constitutional clause challenging it, Judge Reinhardt found "inescapable [the
conclusion] that civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) constitutes 'punishment."' 93
Although the panel in $405,089.23 acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit
had recently characterized a similar forfeiture of property arising from illegal
proceeds as entirely remedial, 94 it rejected that conclusion because it failed to
comport with Austin on three grounds.95 First, noting Austin's reference to
the history of forfeiture statutes "serving not simply remedial goals but also
those of punishment and deterrence, ' 96 Judge Reinhardt reasoned that a
"categorical approach to 'punishment' determinations in the forfeiture
context," rather than a case-by-case analysis, requires a court to focus on the
characteristics of the relevant forfeiture statute as a whole.97 Second, the
panel reasoned that those forfeiture statutes which expressly provide defenses
for property owners lacking culpability must serve "at least in part to deter
8 E.g., id. at 439 ("In the [d]istrict [c]ourt's view, the authorized recovery of more than
$130,000 bore no 'rational relation' to the sum of the [g]overnment's $585 actual loss plus its
costs in investigating and prosecuting Halper's false claims.") (citation omitted).
89 $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1218-19 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (1989)).
90 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
9' See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.") (emphasis added).
9 2Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
93 $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1219.
9' United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994);
Compare Tilley, 18 F.3d at 299 ("[T]he relationship between the amount of the proceeds and
the resulting governmental and societal costs [of illegal drug sales] would not exhibit the
excessive quality found in Halper .. ") with id. at 300 ("When... the property taken by the
government [is] not derived from lawful activities, the forfeiting party loses nothing to which
the law ever entitled him."). See the discussion infra at Part 111(B).
9' $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1220-21.96Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14.
" $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1220.
1995]
78 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
and punish guilty conduct."9 Third, the panel concluded, "[W]here Congress
has tied forfeiture directly to the commission of specified offenses, it is
reasonable to presume that the forfeiture is at least partially intended as an
additional deterrent to or punishment for those violations of law."99 Thus,
these three Austin principles led Judge Reinhardt to conclude that 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) "operate at least in part to punish
and deter."' 0
Additionally, the panel rejected the notion that the statutes relied upon by
the government were solely remedial because they forfeited property only
arising from illegal drug proceeds. 0 ' On the contrary, "[r]ather than render-
ing only the profits of drug dealers subject to forfeiture, [21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6)] applies to nearly any money that is involved in a narcotics
transaction in some fashion."'0 2 Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(1)(A) "applies
to any property which is 'involved in' an illegal money laundering transac-
tion."'0 3 Thus, finding that "the forfeiture statutes at issue here do not serve
solely a remedial purpose," the Ninth Circuit barred the government's civil
action as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.'
In sum, the Ninth Circuit relied on three Supreme Court precedents to
reach a conclusion, contrary to those conclusions reached by the Second,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits: that a civil forfeiture contemporaneously filed
with-and arising from an offense resulting in a criminal conviction-
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because the Ninth Circuit was the first
court of appeals to reach this result,0 5 and because the Supreme Court has yet
to certify the issue, the Ninth Circuit is a renegade. It remains unresolved
whether Judge Reinhardt's panel is ahead of its time, or has simply disre-
garded the law.
9 Id. at 1221.
99 Id.
100 Id.
lo Id.
"'2 Id.; see also id. ("[T]he statute renders forfeitable money that someone intends to use to
purchase drugs, or even money that someone intends to use to purchase a car or boat in order
to facilitate an illegal narcotics transaction.").
103 id.
104Id. at 1222.
" But see United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 1995) (attaching double
jeopardy because the record revealed no governmental intent to attempt a single coordinated
prosecution), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-345).
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III. DISCUSSION
Although the Ninth Circuit's analysis seems persuasive," 6 and has been
followed by the Northern District of Illinois in the Seventh Circuit, 107 this
Note argues that $405,089.23 was wrongly decided. This Part of the Note
follows the same structural analysis of the $405,089.23 decision. Part I(A)
evaluates whether a civil forfeiture and a criminal prosecution arising from the
same offense constitute a single proceeding for double jeopardy analysis.
This examination includes a review of the Ninth Circuit's proclaimed
"common sense," and its ostensibly faithful adherence to Jeffers v. United
States,' in its rejection of the alternative analysis shared by the Second and
Eleventh Circuits.' °9 Part II(B) evaluates whether the sanctions provided for
by 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) constitute punish-
ments. It scrutinizes the Ninth Circuit's gloss on United States v. Halper °
and Austin v. United States,"' and its decision to reject the Fifth Circuit's
alternative approach." 2 Moreover, Part 1II(B) indicates that the Fifth Amend-
ment's required double jeopardy analysis of civil forfeiture differs from that
for the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines analysis, notwithstanding
Austin's claimed application of the Halper test."3 This exposes the Ninth
Circuit's cumulative error in $405,089.23 in its application of Austin's
equivocal version of Halper's duplicitous punishment standard. 1 4
" See United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489,496 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Rymer, J., concurring) ("I concur... only because I am constrained to follow United States
v. $405,089.23 in [sic] US. Currency .... The result I feel obliged to reach... may have other
consequences for parallel civil and criminal proceedings which I find it difficult to believe that
either the Congress or the Court had in mind.") (citations omitted).
'07 United States v. 4204 Thomdale Ave., No. 92 C 3744, 1994 WL 687628, at *10 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 7, 1994).1 Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
,09 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd
as modified en banc. 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161
(U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346).
110 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
"' Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
112 $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1218-22.
113 See infra Part 11(B).
14 See infra Part II(B).
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A. SCOPE: SEPARATE TRIALS, OR A SINGLE COORDINATED PROCEEDING?
After concluding that it should review the claimant's double jeopardy
argument,"5 the Ninth Circuit made a crucial analytical mistake in its reason-
ing. The panel found that "the only difference between the [civil forfeiture
and criminal] proceedings was the remedy sought by the government."" 6 As
a result, the panel held that there was "no reason why two proceedings should
be deemed one when one of the proceedings involves a criminal prosecution
and the other a civil forfeiture action.""' 7 It was wrong to reject the notion
that contemporaneous civil and criminal actions can enforce multiple punish-
ments for a single offense without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Contrary to the position of the Ninth Circuit, there are strong countervailing
rationales for considering a criminal prosecution and a civil forfeiture action
for a single offense as one constitutional jeopardy.
1. Overlooking Constitutionally Required Procedure
In United States v. Millan,"' the Second Circuit held that coordinated
civil and criminal proceedings may arise contemporaneously without violating
the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Constitution requires that the actions
proceed separately.' Faced with coordinated civil and criminal actions
arising from a Drug Enforcement Administration investigation of heroin
distribution by the Bottone family,' the panel framed the issue to resolve
"whether the civil forfeiture suit... was part of a single, coordinated prosecu-
tion of persons involved in alleged criminal activity."' Answering this
question affirmatively, the panel noted,
Civil and criminal suits, by virtue of our federal system of procedure,
must be filed and docketed separately. Therefore, courts must look
past the procedural requirements and examine the essence of the
"s $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1215.16 Id. at 1216 (emphasis added).
"
7 Id. at 1218.
18 United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
1 9 See Millan, 2 F.3d at 20.
'°Id. at 17 (including among the defendant-appellants Alfred V. Bottone, Sr. (a.k.a. Fat Al),
Anthony Bottone, Alfred Bottone (a.k.a. Alfie), and Eric Millan).
121 Id. at 20.
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actions at hand by determining when, how, and why the civil and
criminal actions were initiated.... [Here the two actions arose] as
part of an effort to put an end to an extensive narcotics conspiracy.
We therefore must conclude that the civil forfeiture suit and the
criminal prosecution at issue here constituted a single prosecution
against the [defendants]. 122
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's rationale to resolve a
double jeopardy challenge to the civil forfeiture of a home coordinated with a
criminal action, when defendants allegedly used the home to further illegal
gambling activities." Without rigorous analysis, the panel seemed to suggest
that the American federal system of procedure124 and the constitutional right
to a fair trial 125 require that where the legislature authorizes multiple punish-
ments for a single offense, "the simultaneous pursuit by the government of
criminal and civil sanctions" shall transpire in different proceedings. 2 6 The
Eleventh Circuit properly characterized this practice as a "single, coordinated
prosecution,"'2 7 because it differs from consecutive attempts by the govern-
ment to punish an alleged offender of the law for double jeopardy purposes.' 28
Despite the promulgation of this reasonable proposition, the panel in
$405,089.23 stated that "[a] forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would
" Id. (emphasis added).
i'2 United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493, 1494, 1499 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
124 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (noting governance over all federal civil suits); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 2 (noting governance over all federal criminal actions).
'15 See AM. Jun. 2D Criminal Law § 649 (1981) (footnote omitted):
[D]ue process requires that there be a regular course ofjudicial proceedings and that a criminal
trial proceed according to the established procedure or rules of practice applicable to all such
cases.... [Due process] guarantee[s] procedural standards adequate and appropriate... to
protect at all times persons charged with or suspected of crime....
' One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d at 1499 (emphasis added); see AM. JUR. 2D Criminal
Law § 632 (1981) ('The defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to assert a number of
constitutional and statutory guaranties [unavailable to a defendant in a civil suit]."); see, e.g.,
United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47-48 (noting that persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt
is an evidentiary standard required only in criminal cases), cited in United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242,248 (1980).
12 One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d at 1499.
12See United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17,20 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[We are cognizant that one of
theHalper Court's concerns was that the government might act abusively by seeking a second
punishment when it is dissatisfied with the punishment levied in the first action. That problem
is obviously not present in the instant case, because the civil and criminal actions were
contemporaneous and not consecutive.") (citation omitted) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
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constitute the same proceeding only if they were brought in the same indict-
ment and tried at the same time. '129 Yet the Ninth Circuit did not suggest how
one could accomplish this and adhere to both the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Halper, discussed
below, 3 ' suggested criminal and civil actions could be joined in the same
proceeding, but offered no guidance on the method by which to join them. 131
This silence by the judiciary is no accident. Many problems hinder imple-
menting a plan that would allow a person to combine criminal and civil
actions in a true, single proceeding---not the least of which is negotiating the
application of significantly different burdens of proof. One commentator has
clearly explained these problems:
Using a criminal standard for the entire case might be workable
except for the comparative advantage received by the defendant; the
government would have to prove any claim against the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a lesser civil standard such
as preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the scope of the
discovery is relatively limited in criminal cases. Although prosecu-
tors in criminal cases must turn over exculpatory evidence to the
defense, the defense's discovery rights are, on the whole fairly
limited. In a civil discovery however, the defendant is entitled to
anything "'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence."' The availability and use of depositions also differs
between civil and criminal cases. Choosing civil procedure to govern
the combined proceeding, however, is not an alternative since it could
seriously jeopardize the defendant's [F]ourth and [F]ifth
[A]mendment rights.' 32
129 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd
as modified en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161
(U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346); cf id. at 1216 n.4 (suggesting the legitimacy of bifurcated
proceedings "conducted before the same fact-finder and presiding judicial officer").
"
3
' See infra Part III(B)1.
131 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989).
32 Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying
the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings After United States v. Halper, 76
VA. L. REv. 1251, 1280 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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Aside from the "serious logistical problems... [of] the simultaneous use
of different burdens of proof and discovery rules," '133 different agencies of the
government frequently enforce parallel criminal and civil statutes. 34 More-
over, ensuring that the defendant in such proceedings "is afforded the consti-
tutional safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments" may be impossible. 3 '
From this rationale, one must conclude the practical difficulties of combining
criminal and civil trials in a genuinely single proceeding eliminate its potential
for occurring. 13 6
2. The Problematic Resurrection of Jeffers v. United States..
Notwithstanding the rationale for allowing a Second or Eleventh Circuit
type of single, coordinated prosecution, $405,089.23 creatively uses a
decision from a sharply divided Supreme Court to validate the requirement for
combining proceedings. Jeffers v. United States'38 adjudicated the United
States government's pursuit of parallel criminal actions against a defendant
arising from the same conduct-distributing drugs and conspiring to violate
drug laws.'39 The four Justice plurality in Jeffers stated that "although a
defendant is normally entitled to have charges on [two related offenses]
resolved in one proceeding, there is no violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause when he elects to have the two offenses tried separately."' 40 The four
Justice dissent argued that Jeffers had not and could not waive his double
jeopardy objection,' and that one of the trials should be barred. 42
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the split decision in Jeffers to include a
strongly implied holding by eight Justices to protect defendants subjected to
prosecutions in parallel criminal trials for the same conduct, from at least one
.
33 Jahncke, supra note 19, at 141 n.230.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
137 Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
138 id.
'
31See id. at 139 (plurality) (stating the issue as the "extent of the protection against multiple
prosecutions afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, under
circumstances in which the defendant opposes the Government's efforts to try charges under
21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 848 in one proceeding.").
141Id. at 152.
'4' Id. at 158 (Stevens, J. dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part).
1421 Id. at 158-160.
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of those trials on double jeopardy grounds.'43 In reality, even if the Justices of
the plurality and the dissent are counted together for an agreed-upon notion,
the Jeffers court held only that multiple criminal proceedings against a
defendant should be joined if the crimes charged arise out of the same offense,
and the defendant chooses not to wage separate trials.' The Jeffers decision
suggests nothing about procedural requirements where the government
charges the accused with both criminal and civil violations arising from the
same offense. Moreover, double jeopardy analysis was not extended to civil
sanctions until Halper, decided twelve years after Jeffers. As a result, the
Jeffers rationale cannot logically be extended to concurrent civil and criminal
proceedings.'45
In sum, the Ninth Circuit panel in $405,089.23 erred by simply finding
that related criminal and civil actions instituted by the government create a
double jeopardy violation regardless of any prosecutorial intention to conduct
a single, coordinated trial. $405,089.23 is wrong because it: (1) fails to
consider the inherent procedural differences between criminal and civil
actions, (2) misstates the holding of Jeffers, and (3) arrives at the conclusory
position that "the government is forcing an individual to 'run the gantlet'
more than once."'" Rather than following common sense, the Ninth Circuit's
position ignores the deeply ingrained principle of continuing jeopardy. Surely,
neither legislators nor the Supreme Court agree that a defendant's original
jeopardy ceases once he is convicted, but before the proceeds of his illegal
activity can be forfeited in a parallel action.'47 Thus, where the government
141 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd
as modified en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161
(U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346).
'44 See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 160 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment in part) ("[E]ight Justices agree that petitioner's constitutional right was violated and
only four are persuaded that he waived his double jeopardy objection.").
145 See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
146 $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190
(1957)).
14" Compare United States v. U.S. Currency, 18 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1994) (doubting that
Congress or the Constitution requires the application of Halper to bar civil forfeitures once
related criminal penalties have already been imposed) with Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp.
817, 827 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (recognizing that where a double jeopardy violation infects related,
parallel criminal and civil actions, courts must determine which sanction constitutes the second,
prohibited punishment).
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court could have intended for courts to make such a
determination. When a court concludes that it must void one of two parallel proceedings
because of double jeopardy, it has no guidance to rely upon to make its choice. Arbitrary and
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simultaneously files criminal and civil actions against a defendant for the
alleged commission of a single offense, original jeopardy does not terminate
until both actions have concluded free from trial error.
B. PUNISHMENT: WHEN IS CIVIL FORFEITURE A CONSTITUTIONAL
PUNISHMENT?
The Ninth Circuit's determination that the civil forfeitures authorized by
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) constitute punishment
relies on the development of a test in two Supreme Court cases: United
States v. Halper148 and Austin v. United States.'49  Because both cases
represent marked departures from precedent,50 one should cautiously accept
the viability of each application of their holdings to different fact patterns.' 5'
Thus, a thoughtful analysis of $405,089.23 requires a detailed understanding
of the facts, language, and scope of the holding in both Halper and Austin.
1. United States v. Halper: A Double Standard for Double Jeopardy
In Halper, the government indicted Irwin Halper, a manager of a medical
service company in New York City, on sixty-five counts of violating the
criminal false-claims statute,'52 for allegedly misrepresenting the services his
inconsistent application of the law seems a certain result.
148 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
41 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
"I See Lauren 0. Clapp, Note, United States v. Halper Remedial Justice and Double
Jeopardy, 68 N.C. L. REv. 979,980 (1990) (noting the Court's failure in cases before Halper
even to consider that, under some circumstances, civil penalties could serve punitive ends); see
also Dallet, supra note 19, at 238 n.16 (noting that Austin was only the second time that the
Court had considered an application of the Excessive Fines Clause, and on the first occasion had
rejected it).
"I SeeHalper, 490 U.S. at 451 ("[T]he only proscription established by our ruling is that the
[g]ovemment may not criminally prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him,
and then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and receive ajudgment that is
not rationally related to the goal of making the [g]ovemment whole."); see also Austin, 113 S.
Ct. 2801 at 2812 (declining to establish a test to determine excessive forfeitures-despite its
clear holding of most forfeitures as punishments-because "[p]rudence dictates that.., the
lower courts... consider that question in the first instance").
152 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988). The statute states:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military,
or naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency
thereof, any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or
agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent,
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company provided on sixty-five separate occasions between 1982 and
1983.53 After convicting Halper on all counts, the district court sentenced
him to imprisonment for two years and fined him $5000."' Following this
judgment, the government brought a civil claim against Halper under the False
Claims Act. 55 The facts established at Halper's conviction persuaded the
district court to grant the government's motion for summary judgment . 56
Because Halper violated the act on sixty-five separate occasions, the court
recognized that the statute required fines for Halper exceeding $130,000.151
The court declined to impose the fines, cursorily reasoning that "this civil
remedy, designed to make the government whole, would constitute a second
punishment for double jeopardy analysis."' 58
The United States moved for, and was granted, reconsideration of the
judgment.'59 Although the district court admitted error, ruling that it did not
have to assess the statutory penalty for each count, it recharacterized its
evaluation of the penalty as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause's
prohibition against multiple punishments in separate proceedings. 60 The
United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court. In a unanimous
decision, the Court held "that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant
who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected
to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution."16
shall be imprisoned not more than five years and shall be subject to a fine
in the amount provided in this title.153Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
154/id.
155Id. at438. TheFalse Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982 & Supp. 111985) states:
A person not a member of an armed force of the United States is liable to
the United States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount
equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government sustains because
of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action if the person ....
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved.
156Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
157Id.
158 Id. at 438-439 (citing United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
modified, 664 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).159 id.
"'Id. (citing United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852, 853-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), modifying
660 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).
161 Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added).
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Thus, Halper's "liability of $130,000 for false claims amounting to $585,
constitutes a second 'punishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy analy-
sis.162
Halper's specific holding includes two elements. First, it precludes the
initiation of a civil action by the government resulting in the imposition of a
civil penalty following a criminal punishment for the same offense.163 Second,
it defines as punishment those civil sanctions that "may not fairly be charac-
terized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 16 The practical
corollaries of these directives are that multiple punishments adjudged during
one's original jeopardy and civil sanctions, which include any remedial
purpose, remain constitutionally viable.165 Despite this, some language in the
opinion obscures and diminishes the precedential value of these precepts. In
particular, immediately preceding the Court's "hold[ing] that under the
Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished... may
not be subjected to an additional civil sanction.., that... may not fairly be
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution,"6 6 the Court
stated "that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a reme-
dial purpose... is punishment."'167 The Court seemingly lurches from one
extreme to another. First, the Court defines punishment as any sanction
merely including deterrent or retributive ends; then it limits punishment under
the Double Jeopardy Clause to any sanction serving only deterrent or retribu-
tive ends. This duplicitous language, combined with the Court's later decision
in Austin-purportedly applying the true Halper test-has formed a confus-
ing and random amalgam of ideas constituting a primordial soup in which the
Ninth Circuit's flawed ideas spawned and developed.
.
621d. at 441; see also id. at 452.
163 Id. at 451.
Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
165 See id. at 451 n.10 ("[T]he multiple-punishment inquiry in the context of a single
proceeding focuses on whether the legislature actually authorized the cumulative punishment");
see also id. at 449-50 ("Where... the civil penalty... bears no rational relation to the goal
of compensating the [g]ovemment for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as 'punishment' in
the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting... to determine
if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment.") (emphasis added).
1"6 Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added).
167 Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
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2. Austin v. United States: The Court Equivocates on Halper's Test
The Austin Court ostensibly applied the Halper test to hold that civil
forfeitures constitute punishment for Excessive Fines Clause1 6 analysis. 169 In
this case, the government indicted Richard Lyle Austin in August 1990, for
violating South Dakota drug laws by, among other things, possessing cocaine
with the intent to distribute it.' 70 Subsequent to Austin's guilty plea, the
United States filed an in rem civil action to forfeit Austin's trailer and auto
body shop.' 7' Austin challenged this action, arguing that the Excessive Fines
Clause prohibits the government from forfeiting such property in a civil
action. 172
The Austin case afforded the Court only its second occasion to consider
the Excessive Fines Clause. 73  Without significant precedent, the Court
achieved a unanimous judgment. 74 Holding that the Excessive Fines Clause
applies to civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a),' 71 the Court remanded the
case to determine whether the clause prohibited forfeiture in this instance. 176
Despite this unanimous decision to remand, the Justices divided over the
rationale explaining why the Court could test Austin's fine for exceeding
constitutional limits.
177
The five-Justice majority opinion lacks a consistent rationale to buttress
its result, and instead contains contradictory statements similar to and actually
building upon those found in Halper 78 First, the majority stated that the
purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause is "to prevent the government from
16' See the second clause within U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
169 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
170 Id. at 2803.
171 Id.
172 Id. The action was based on 21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
"3Id. at 2804 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)).
174 Id. at 2802.
175 Id. at 2812 & n.14.
176 See id. ("The [c] lause prohibits only the imposition of 'excessive' fines . .
171 See id. at 2813 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he
Court's opinion., needlessly attempts to derive from our sparse caselaw on the subject of in
rem forfeiture the questionable proposition that the owner of property taken pursuant to such
forfeiture is always blameworthy."); id. at 2815 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("[I]n its eagerness to discover a unified theory of forfeitures, [the Court]
recites a consistent rationale of personal punishment that neither the cases nor other narratives
of the common law suggest.").
178 See id. at 2805-12.
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abusing its power to punish."'79 Second, the majority stated that "the
question is whether forfeiture serves in part to punish, and one need not
exclude the possibility that forfeiture serves other purposes to reach that
conclusion."' 0 This statement seemingly invalidates all civil forfeitures for
double jeopardy purposes because "forfeiture [always] serves, at least in part,
to punish the owner' as a result of its ."punitive and deterrent purposes,'
and 'impos[ition of] an economic penalty.""' .82 Thus, the Court stated two
different standards. The first standard creates a relatively high threshold
where a given forfeiture is an abuse of the government's power to punish.
The second standard creates a relatively low threshold where a given forfeiture
merely has the effect of punishing.
To compound this duality, the Court injected a new distinction into the
Halper test. The Court stated:
[I]t appears to make little practical difference whether the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to all forfeitures... or only to those that cannot
be characterized as purely remedial. The Clause prohibits only the
imposition of "excessive" fines, and a fine that serves purely reme-
dial purposes cannot be considered "excessive" in any event.18 3
Thus, whether forfeiture always serves to punish or not, the relevant
query for the Excessive Fines Clause is whether those forfeitures that do
punish, punish excessively. The Excessive Fines Clause can apply to mitigate
a forfeiture, without barring it. Thus, the Court's test inAustin lacks a clear
standard to apply outside of the excessive fines context'8 4 because its test for
179 Id. at 2804 (second emphasis added).
'
8 1d. at 2810 n.12.
"' Id. at 2810; see also id. at 2813 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("Mhe statutory forfeiture must always be at least 'partly punitive,' or else it is not
a fine.").
'RId. at 2810 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearsom Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686, 687
(1974)) (citations omitted).
..
3 Id. at 2812 n.14 (emphasis added).
184 See Jahncke, supra note 19 (suggesting that the Excessive Fines Clause, rather than the
Double Jeopardy Clause, should apply to and potentially bar civil punishments, because the
Excessive Fines Clause is unburdened by the confused mass of case law distorting double
jeopardy jurisprudence).
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excessive fines analysis differs significantly from the double jeopardy analysis
of Halper.'s
3. The Ninth Circuit's Cumulative Error
Despite the limited and confusing guidance that Halper and Austin offer,
the Ninth Circuit decision in $405,089.23 relies exclusively on these cases to
find that civil forfeitures authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) constitute punishment. 186 The opinion states that "[i]n Austin,
the Court specifically applied the Halper test to determine whether a civil
forfeiture... constituted 'punishment' ... .,,l87 This is superficially correct.
Austin does state, "Under [Halper] the question is whether forfeiture serves
inpart to punish."'88 However, Austin addressed the Excessive Fines Clause,
not the Double Jeopardy clause. Because of the nature of the excessive fines
analysis,8 9 Austin sheds little light on double jeopardy claims.
Recall the holding of Halper:
[U]nder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who al- ready has
been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may
not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution.'9"
'See infra notes 191-203 and accompanying text. But see Department of Revenue of Mont.
v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("To hold... that [a
civil sanction] is not exempt from scrutiny under the Double Jeopardy Clause says nothing about
whether imposition of the tax is unconstitutional.") (emphasis added).
"6 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1218-22 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd
as modified en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995),petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161
(U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346).
1871d. at 1219.
18 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 n. 12 (1993).
'
89 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
190 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-449 (1989) (emphasis added); see also id. at
449 ("What we announce now is a rule for the rare case .... The rule is one of reason: Where
... the civil penalty ... bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the government
for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as 'punishment' in the plain meaning of the word, then
the defendant is entitled to [a determination of whether the second penalty is in fact a second
punishment].") (emphasis added).
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The Court's holding in Halper implies a threshold beyond which a civil
sanction becomes wholly punitive and does not rationally serve to compensate
the government, even in part.'91 Reaching this brink is a condition precedent
to the inclusion of a civil sanction in double jeopardy analysis.'92 Although
Halper recognizes that determining when a fine crosses this threshold is
"difficult if not impossible,"'93 the opinion emphasizes "the process of
affixing a sanction that compensates the government for all its costs inevita-
bly involves an element of rough justice" 94-- ncluding "the ordinary case
fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages provisions."' 95 Essentially, the Halper
protection "is a rule for the rare case ... where a fixed-penalty provision
subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages he has caused."'9 6 As such, it does not apply
in Austin, regardless of its citation there.
Rather, Austin created a standard peculiar to excessive fines claims,
197
and thus holds only that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to forfeitures.'9"
Recall, the Court stated that it does not matter "whether the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to all forfeitures... or only to those that cannot be character-
ized as purely remedial. The Clause prohibits only the imposition of 'exces-
sive' fines ... ."'9' Under this standard, the application of the Excessive
Fines Clause to a forfeiture does not require its prohibition. Thus, Austin
regards fines that punish as commonalties, although few fines punish exces-
sively.200
This removes civil sanctions that punish appropriately from the "rare
case" that Halper describes for double jeopardy analysis. In one Judge's
opinion, it "transforms the 'rare case' where Halper contemplates that double
9 See id. at 449 ("[The] rare case... [is] where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has
caused.").
192 Cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text.
'
93Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 id.
1 Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
19I d. at 2812 n.14 (remanding the case to determine whether the forfeiture of Austin's
mobile home constituted an excessive punishment, in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause).
199 Id.
'Id. at 2812-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
all fines are payments to the government as punishment).
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jeopardy will apply to civil proceedings into a commonplace occurrence, and
may have ... consequences for parallel civil and criminal proceedings which
I find it difficult to believe that either the Congress or the Court had in
mind."22 ' Considering the Halper Court's statement that "[n]othing in
today's ruling precludes the government from seeking the full civil penalty
against a defendant who previously has not been punished for the same
conduct, even if the civil sanction imposed is punitive,"202 it is difficult to
argue otherwise.
By ignoring the difference between the standards used to determine a
particular sanction's applicability under the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
Excessive Fines Clause, and the significance of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), which
unlike 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7), 2"3 deals with the forfeiture of
illegal proceeds from drug sales, the Ninth Circuit resolved the issue inappro-
priately. This failure to apply the proper test for punishment by relying
improperly upon Austin is especially apparent in the Ninth Circuit's rejection
of the Fifth Circuit's position in United States v. Tilley.204 In that case, the
Tilley and Anderson couples sought a dismissal of their criminal indictment
for selling illegal drugs because it followed an allegedly punitive, civil
forfeiture for the same conduct, thereby violating the bar against double
jeopardy.2 5 The Fifth Circuit panel held that "the forfeiture of [the defen-
dants'] unlawful proceeds of illegal drug sales does not constitute punish-
ment. '216 Two independent reasons support this position. First,
The forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug sales serves the wholly
remedial purposes of reimbursing the government for the costs of
detection, investigation, and prosecution of drug traffickers and
reimbursing society for the costs of combating the allure of illegal
20! United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489, 496 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Rymer, J., concurring).
202 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989).
203 The statutory provisions applicable in Austin.
' United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
205 Tilley, 18 F.3d at 296.
206 id.
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drugs, caring for the victims of the criminal trade when preventive
efforts prove unsuccessful, lost productivity, etc.2°7
Second, the forfeiture of illegally derived proceeds "does not punish the
defendant because it exacts no price in liberty or lawfully derived property
from him. 20
8
Despite these compelling reasons, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Fifth
Circuit's position, arguing that the Austin Court "explicitly refused to apply
such a case-by-case approach to determining whether a forfeiture constitutes
'punishment.' 20 9 However, Austin's equivocation on the word "punish-
ment," 21--- transforming Halper's rare case into a common, perhaps even
categorical occurrence 2' '- does not extend from the Excessive Fines Clause
analysis to a Double Jeopardy Clause analysis. Further, Halper gave a
specific policy rationale for its proscription, which cannot implicitly be
undermined by Austin's equivocation: "when the [g]overnment already has
imposed a criminal penalty and seeks to impose additional punishment in a
second proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the possibil-
ity that the [g]ovemment is seeking the second punishment because it is
dissatisfied with the sanction obtained in the first proceeding."2 2 Such is not
the case where the government files both actions contemporaneously. Instead,
parallel criminal and civil actions authorized by statute are "a coordinated
effort to put an end to [particular criminal activities]. 21 3 Therefore, Halper
and Austin should not prevent concurrent civil and criminal trials because,
Id. at 299 (citations omitted); see also id. ("Various sources estimate that illegal drug sales
produce approximately $80 to $100 billion per year while exacting $60 to $120 billion per year
in costs to the government and society. Clearly, the above overlapping estimates of proceeds
and resulting costs are not 'overwhelmingly disproportionate' on a national level .... )
(citations and footnote omitted); accord S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
20' Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added); see also id. ("[T]he forfeiture of proceeds from
illegal drug sales is more closely akin to the seizure of the proceeds from the robbery of a federal
bank than the seizure of lawfully derived real property.").
209 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1220 (9th Cir. 1994), affil
as modified en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995),petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161
(U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346).211 See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
211 $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1220.
212 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,451 n.10 (1989) (emphasis added).
213 United States v. Millan, 2 F,3d 17,20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
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when combined as "a single, coordinated prosecution," '214 they constitute the
same jeopardy.
4. The Supreme Court's Increasing Awareness of its Poor Guidance
Before the Ninth Circuit wrote $405,089.23, the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to clarify its double jeopardy analysis in Department of Revenue
of Montana v. Kurth Ranch."' In that case, the Court reviewed the validity
of Montana's tax on the possession and storage of illegal drugs at the Kurth
family ranch, following two separate proceedings for the same offense-a
settled civil forfeiture and a criminal prosecution." 6 The Court held that the
tax violated the Double Jeopardy Clause for two reasons. First, Montana
levied the tax on goods which "no longer exist[ed] and that the taxpayer never
lawfully possessed has an unmistakabl[y] punitive character., 21 7 Because the
tax imposed equaled "more than eight times the drug's market value,"218 it
could "'not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution.' 219 Second, "The proceeding Montana initiated to collect a tax
on the possession of drugs was the functional equivalent of a successive
criminal prosecution., 220 Although the Court forcefully divided, with four
Justices delivering three dissenting opinions, statements in each separate
214 United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
21 Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
216 Id. at 1941-42; cf infra text accompanying note 227.
2
,7 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
2" Id. at 1946.
219 Id. at 1945 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989)). The Court
also considered that the tax was "conditioned on the commission of a crime" as a factor in its
determination. Id. at 1947.
22Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. The Court never explained how it reached this opinion.
Whether the tax proceeding followed or paralleled the criminal prosecution is subject to differing
opinions. See United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In Kurth Ranch
itself the tax proceeding was begun at the same time as the criminal prosecution; the Supreme
Court did not think the fact that the two were pending contemporaneously mattered."). But see
In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 63-66 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (noting that between the start
of the criminal prosecution on October 18, 1987 and the initial tax assessment on December 8,
1987, the new tax regulations were unavailable to calculate the assessment until November 13,
1987), affid, No. CV-90-084-GF, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont. Apr. 23, 1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d
1308 (9th Cir. 1993), affd, Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994). However, it seems more likely that the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana
familiarized itself with the facts in Kurth Ranch to a greater degree than the Seventh Circuit.
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opinion should have guided the Ninth Circuit toward a different conclusion
than the one arrived at in $405,089.23.
The majority in Kurth Ranch indicated that civil actions which result in
secondary punishments and proceed contemporaneously with criminal
prosecutions do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, the Court
characterized the challenged sanction-a punitive tax following settled
criminal and civil trials-as a "separate sanction imposed in [a] successive
proceeding."' Barring this tariff implies nothing about the validity of
sanctions imposed in parallel proceedings that the American rules of proce-
dure require. 2 Second, the Court noted that taxes "serve a purpose quite
different from [other] civil penalties, and [thus] Halper's method of determin-
ing whether the exaction was remedial or punitive 'simply does not work in
the case of a tax statute.', 223 Tax statutes should serve two purposes: pure
revenue-raising, or revenue-raising coupled with deterrence of disfavored, but
legal, activities?" Although "a civil penalty may be imposed as a remedy for
actual costs to the State that are attributable to the defendant's conduct,, 225 a
tax cannot because its primary function is to raise revenue, not to compensate
the government or society. 26 Finally, the Court's silent acquiescence to the
defendants' settlement of the coordinated criminal and civil trials preceding
the tax assessment, suggests that the government could conceivably hold such
contemporaneous trials where the legislature authorizes it to do so. 2 7
Justice O'Connor dissented over a disagreement about when Halper
analysis should apply.228  Among her criticisms, the Justice noted that
"[holding] that Montana's drug tax is not exempt from scrutiny under the
Double Jeopardy Clause says nothing about whether the imposition of the tax
is unconstitutional." '229 Justice O'Connor rebuked the majority for finding
'tKurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947 n.21 (emphasis added); see supra note 220.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 118-29.
m Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948 (quoting id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)); see
also id. at 1947 ('axes imposed upon illegal activities are fundamentally different from taxes
with a pure revenue-raising purpose that are imposed despite their adverse effect on the taxed
activity.").
224 Id.
mid. at 1948.
226 id.
21Id. at 1942. But see United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 575 (1995),petitionfor cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-345).
" See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1952-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1953; cf supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
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that a "drug tax is always punitive" by finding that step "entirely unnecessary
to preserve individual liberty.
230
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented separately and raised concerns about
the abuse of the Halper analysis.13 ' Unlike Justice O'Connor, the Chief
Justice agreed with the majority's superficial rejection of Halper's application
to the Montana tax;232 but he argued that the majority did not truly reject
Halper's application to taxes.2 33 Each of these opinions reveal its author's
desire to limit Halper's reach more so than the majority's holding.
The most compelling statements, however, were made by Justice Scalia,
with whom Justice Thomas joined in dissent:
[T]he repetition of a dictum does not turn it into a holding, and an
examination of the cases discussing the prohibition against multiple
punishments demonstrates that, until Halper, the Court never invali-
dated a legislatively authorized successive punishment. The disposi-
tions were entirely consistent with the proposition that the restriction
derived exclusively from the due-process requirement of legislative
authorization.234
Thus, at least two Justices believe that "Halper [itself] was in error," '235
and that courts can resolve all multiple punishment problems without even
addressing claims of double jeopardy. Rather, legislative due process answers
the problems of multiple punishment by requiring "prior legislative authoriza-
tion for whatever punishment is imposed."2 36 As one commentator suggested
three years before Kurth Ranch, "In such a proceeding, the multiple punish-
ment inquiry would be limited to ensuring that the total punishment does not
exceed that authorized by the legislature.
'2 37
Justice Scalia's dissent also acknowledged that "until Halper was
decided, extending the 'no-double-punishments' rule to civil penalties, it did
230 Id. at 1955 (emphasis added).
13 See id. at 1949-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 1949.
233 Id. ("[T]he Court then goes astray and the end result of its decision is a hodgepodge of
criteria .... )234Id. at 1956 (Scalia J., dissenting).235 Id. at 1958.236 Id. at 1956.
" Jahncke, supra note 19, at 134-35.
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not much matter whether that rule was a free-standing constitutional prohibi-
tion implicit in the Double Jeopardy Clause or ... merely an aspect of the Due
Process Clause requirement of legislative authorization., 238 Justice Scalia
continued, writing:
[B]rief experience with the new regime ... [demonstrates] that the
erroneous holding [ofHalper] produces results too strange for judges
to endure, and regularly demands judgments of the most problematic
sort. And to the latter: We dodged the bullet in Halper-or perhaps
a more precise metaphor would be that we thrust our lower-court
colleagues between us and the bullet--by leaving it to the lower
courts to determine at what particular dollar level the civil fine
exceeded the [g]ovemment's "legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objective" and thus became a penalty.2 39
Ultimately, the legacy of Halper remains somewhat uncertain z.24  At least
one Justice who joined the Halper majority now finds it erroneous.24'
Moreover, there is sharp disagreement concerning its point of application, and
whether its application always effects a prohibition of a challenged sanction.
Perhaps most important is that the Court could now overrule the 5-4 decision
in Kurth Ranch because the Court's newest member, Justice Breyer, has
replaced one of the Justices who joined in the Kurth Ranch majority.2 4 2
Regardless, Kurth Ranch may be used to bar only the rare tax that is both
intended solely to punish an accused, and is levied subsequent to the termina-
tion of other governmental proceedings against a defendant. Thus, while the
2" Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"
9Id. at 1958 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989)); see also United
States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489, 496 (9th Cir. 1994) (Rymer, J.,
concurring) ("The result I feel obligated to reach [because of our holding in $405,089.23]
effectively transforms the 'rare case' wherelHalper contemplates that double jeopardy will apply
to civil proceedings... into a commonplace occurrence, and may have other consequences for
parallel civil and criminal proceedings which I find it difficult to believe that either the Congress
or the Court had in mind.") (citation omitted).
2 See Abramowitz, supra note 1, at 3 (considering whether the Court will revisit Halper to
limit or overrule the decision).
241 See Department of Rev. of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Halper was in error .... ").
242Justice Breyer replaced Justice Blackmun beginning in the 1994-95 Term. See generally,
e.g., Martel v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d I (1st Cir. 1993) (offering little guidance regarding Justice
Breyer's disposition of the Halper test while sitting as the First Circuit's Chief Judge).
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Kurth Ranch Court has retreated from a liberal application of the Halper test,
the Ninth Circuit has erroneously extended it.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in $405,089.23 is persuasive, but
erroneous. The court ignores an important distinction between the facts that
it faced and the facts before the Jeffers Court when it states that "parallel
actions, instituted at about the same time and involving the same criminal
conduct, constitute separate proceedings for double jeopardy purposes." '24 3
Because there are significant differences between federal criminal and civil
procedure, prosecutors cannot join such actions and fairly consider them
single, coordinated prosecutions. 244 $405,089.23 also ignores the narrow
holding of Halper, reexamined and reiterated by the Court recently in Kurth
Ranch by both the dissenters and the majority. Finally, $405,089.23 misreads
and misapplies the holding in Austin despite the well-reasoned guidance
offered by the Fifth Circuit in Tilley. In the end, the Supreme Court may have
to resolve this attractive misapplication of law. Until it does so, the Ninth
Circuit remains a renegade,245 and will dissimilarly treat similarly situated
persons who violate the law in other jurisdictions.
Adam R. Fox
243 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1217 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd
as modified en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161
(U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346).
2 See United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
245 See, e.g., United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1994)
(following $405,089.23); United States v. Real Property Located at Incline Village, 47 F.3d
1511 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
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